Justice Owen Roberts\u27s Revolution of 1937 by Geldreich, Gill Robert
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
University of Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects University of Tennessee Honors Program
Spring 4-1997
Justice Owen Roberts's Revolution of 1937
Gill Robert Geldreich
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj
This is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Tennessee Honors Program at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and
Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geldreich, Gill Robert, "Justice Owen Roberts's Revolution of 1937" (1997). University of Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/216
AppendixD- UNIVERSITY HONORS PROGRAM 
SENIOR PROJECT - APPROVAL 
Name: ____ ~Ul_§~l~~~i~~ __________________________________ _ 
CoIl e g e: __ ~.!:!~~_~~Le,~S._____ De par tm en t: JiL~j)S~ ______________ _ 
Faculty ~entor: _p~~~j!t~~_~l~1L _____________________________ _ 
p R OJ E C T TITL E: __ \[\!lU£~_J>_~~_.fu'J~~t~~_B~~qJ~CLIl_b~_1~~1 ____ _ 
I have reviewed this completed senior honors thesis with this student and certify 
that it is a project commensurate with honors level undergraduate research in this 
field. 
Signed: __ ~ __ !!l_Z~~ ___________________ , Faculty Mentor 
Date: __ .1/!i/i.L _________ _ 
Comments (Optional): 
27 
Justice Owen Roberts's Revolution of 1937 
Gill Geldreich 
A Paper Submitted to the History Honors Program at the University of Tennessee at 
Knoxville 
April, 1997 
Introduction: Roberts v. Roosevelt 
At the beginning of 1937, the United States government stood in an awkward position. 
Two of its three branches were locked in a struggle to determine the future course of the 
American political economy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to establish a system of 
managed capitalism under expanded constitutional doctrines, while the Supreme Court held 
steady to a strict, laissez-faire constitutionalism. It was, perhaps, "the most serious conflict 
between the three branches of our government in this century."l Though the outcome of this 
struggle is not in doubt, there is debate over how this "constitutional revolution" came to be.2 
The popular mythology is that the Court retreated from its opposing stance owing to the 
popularity of tfie New Deal and the threat of Roosevelt's court-packing proposal. As the 
political satirist Finley Peter Dunne wrote years earlier, "No matther whether th' constitution 
follows th' flag or not, th' supreme court follows th' iliction returns.,,3 
True to the mythology, the Supreme Court did reverse itself in West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish [300 US 379 (1937)], a decision which upheld a Washington state minimum wage 
law for women. Ten months earlier, the same justices had struck down a nearly identical New 
York state law. Since the interim period included a stunning election victory for Roosevelt 
followed by his proposal of "judicial reform," the logical conclusion seemed to be that the 
Court bowed to Roosevelt and gave its blessing to the New Deal.4 In reality, however, the 
situation was not as simple. The personnel of the Court during the 1930' s is vital to an 
1 Peter Irons, The New Deal Lawyers, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 273. 
2 Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution Ltd., (Claremont, CA: Claremont Colleges, 1941.) Professor 
Corwin's book was the first to refer to these events as a "constitutional revolution." 
3 Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley's Opinions. (New York: R.H. Russell, 1901), p. 26. 
2 
understanding of this controversy.5 Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van 
Devanter were popularly dubbed the "Four Horsemen of Reaction": conservative, elderly, and 
always voting as a group. Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone provided a liberal voice in the Court. 
In the middle, then, were two justices whose swing vote became critical to every major issue 
before the Court: Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen 1. Roberts. Chief 
Justice Hughes, a masterful politician as well as a judge, voted usually with the liberals of the 
Court.6 This four-four split left Justice Roberts, a former corporation lawyer who had also 
prosecuted cases for the government, at the center of the controversy between Roosevelt and 
the Supreme Court. 
Justice Roberts's vote was the difference between the 5-4 ruling in New York v. 
Morehead ex rei. Tipaldo [298 US 587 (1936)] which struck down a New York minimum 
wage law, and the 5-4 ruling ten months later in the Parrish case which upheld an identical 
Washington law. Justice Roberts's change of mind became popularly known as the "switch in 
time that saved nine," since the Court's reversal made Roosevelt's court-packing plan seem 
unnecessary . 
Court followers and historians have since accused Roberts of vacillation or 
manipulation. According to Justice Felix Frankfurter, it was "lazy repetition of uncritical talk 
that a judge with the character of Roberts should have attributed to him a change of judicial 
views out of deference to political considerations.,,7 Nonetheless, such talk had become so 
common that Frankfurter, after "not a little persuasion," convinced Roberts to recount the 
4 Pres. Roosevelt's plan to reform the judiciary can be found in Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Supreme Court, 
Alfred Haines Cope and Fred Krinsky, eds., (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1969), Pp. 18-27. 
5 See Appendix B. 
6 Fred Rodell, Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1955, (New York: Random 
House, 1955), p. 223. 
events of his reversal to him upon his retirement from the Court. Frankfurter published the 
memorandum written to him by Roberts after his death in 1955.8 
This study seeks to evaluate the facts as they were presented by Roberts and also as 
they are found in the judicial record. It will continue the work of others in seeking to find out 
what persuaded Roberts to change his vote.9 Unlike most others, however, this study will 
concentrate also on Roberts's mindset throughout the New Deal and his attitude toward the 
political environment in which he operated. This will be accomplished by an evaluation of 
the opinions Roberts wrote for the Court and of other primary sources such as contemporary 
press articles. Unfortunately, Roberts left no substantial personal records which would be 
invaluable to a study of this type. 10 
Despite the fact that evidence concerning th~se events is lacking, historians have put 
forth various explanations for Roberts's switch. Given the accepted fact that his vote in the 
Parrish decision was recorded in conference on December 19, 1936,11 before Roosevelt's 
court plan was announced on February 5, 1937, at least one historian has suggested that 
Roberts and the justices knew about the plan prior to its announcement, thereby altering their 
course early to conform with the wishes of the administration.12 There is no conclusive 
evidence to support such a claim. Another has proposed that Roberts changed his mind in 
response to Roosevelt's massive 1936 election victory.13 This assertion is more credible, yet 
it does not fully explain Robert's motives behind his votes in these two cases. This study 
7 "Mr. Justice Roberts," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, CIV (1955): 313. 
8 Ibid., p. 314-315. See also Appendix A. 
9 John W. Chambers, "The Big Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum Wage Cases," Labor History X 
(1969): 44-73; Charles A. Leonard, A Search For a Judicial Philosophy: Mr. Justice Roberts and the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1937, (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971.) 
10 Leonard, Search For a Judicial Philosophy, Pp. 184-185. 
11 See Appendix A. 
12 Rodell, Nine Men, p. 249. 
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seeks to do that, and it proposes that Justice Roberts had personal political ambitions in mind 
when he voted to strike down the New York minimum wage law in June, 1936. In response 
to the nearly universal condemnation of the Tipaldo decision and Roosevelt's election victory, 
Roberts changed his vote and voted to affirm the minimum wage law seven months later in 
Parrish. 
The body of this paper is organized into four distinct sections: The first is a discussion 
of Roberts's life and career leading up to his nomination as a Supreme Court Justice, followed 
by an analysis of his opinion in Nebbia v. New York [291 US 502 (1934)]. The second section 
is an analysis of Roberts's attitude toward the New Deal during the 1935 and 1936 terms of 
the Court, centering mainly on his opinions in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad 
Co. [295 US 330 (1935)] and United States v. Butler [297 US 1 (1936)]. The third section 
focuses on the political environment during the 1936 elections and on the controversy 
surrounding the Court's Tipaldo decision. The fourth and final section is an analysis of 
Roberts's reversal in Parrish. A brief discussion outlining general conclusions to be drawn 
from this study follows at the end of the fourth section. 
Part I: Owen Roberts, the Man and the Justice 
Owen Josephus Roberts was born on May 2, 1875, in Germantown, Pennsylvania, a 
small town which has since become a respectable suburb of Philadelphia. His father, a 
prosperous, middle-class hardware merchant and wagon dealer, was involved in local 
Republican politics throughout Roberts's young life. 14 A Fortune magazine feature in 1936 
13 Chambers, "The Big Switch," p. 71. 
14 Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, Nine Old Men, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Doran, & Co., 1937), p. 
142. 
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which described the careers of all the justices of the Court commented that Roberts had been 
"gently born into the conservative circles of America's most conservative city, 
Philadelphia.,,15 
Roberts took advantage of his stabile middle-class surroundings and was able to excel 
at his schoolwork, enough so that he was admitted to the prestigious and nearby University of 
Pennsylvania. During his undergraduate career, Roberts was the "plugging type to be found in 
every college clasS."I6 His list of activities in his senior yearbook was longer than anyone 
else's save one, the class president's. After graduation, Roberts enrolled directly at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, where he took a great interest in constitutional law as 
it was taught by C. Stuart Patterson, general solicitor for the Pennsylvania Railroad. 17 
While in law school, Roberts concentrated on good scholarship and making valu~ble 
contacts. Upon his graduation, he became part of the "University Crowd," the elite social 
group which dominated the politics and economics of Philadelphia. Members of the 
"University Crowd" were doctors, lawyers, and businessmen who were willing to help out 
fellow Pennsylvania graduates. 18 Roberts was destined to have a fabulous and lucrative legal 
career with the "University Crowd" backing him. Fellow graduates helped him obtain 
corporate clients such as the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. and J.P. Morgan. 19 Roberts became a 
gifted attorney, and although he was "lawyer to several corporations ... he never served anyone 
long enough to earn the title 'corporation lawyer.",2o 
15 "Mr. Justice Roberts," Fortune XIII (1936), 192. 
16 Pearson and Allen, Nine Old Men, Pp. 142-143. 
17 David Burner, "Owen J. Roberts," The Justices of the Supreme Court 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major 
Opinions, Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds., vol. 3, (New York: Chelsea House, 1969,) p. 2254. 
18 Pearson and Allen, Nine Old Men, Pp. 142-143. 
19 Rodell, Nine Men, p.222. 
20 Burner, "Owen J. Roberts," p. 2254. 
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One such member of the "University Crowd" who assisted Roberts was George 
Wharton Pepper. Pepper, a powerful Republican and distinguished Philadelphia attorney, had 
graduated from the law school eight years prior to Roberts. As a law instructor he had come 
into contact with Roberts while he was a student, and he assisted Roberts as any member of 
the "Crowd" would. 21 The n10st significant assistance occurred in 1924 when Pepper, by then 
an United States Senator, recommended Roberts for a position as a special government 
prosecutor in the politically sensitive "Teapot Dome" oil scandals. In his autobiography, 
Pepper recalled his recommendation of Roberts to President Coolidge: "Mr. President, the 
Administration needs the best available man for this job. I know one who combines character, 
ability, fearlessness and wide experience and against whom no disqualifying insinuations can 
be made.,,22 Pepper broughti,Roberts personally to Washington, and President Coolidge was 
so impressed with Roberts that he immediately submitted his name to the Senate for 
confinnation. 
Roberts's nomination aroused suspicion among Senate liberals. His corporate clients 
caused them to wonder if Roberts would pursue forthrightly his work as a government 
prosecutor. In particular, a speech which Roberts had given at a 1923 executive conference 
was read into the Congressional Record. In the speech, Roberts defended the high salaries 
which oil executives were receiving: 
Now, gentlemen, what will nationalization bring? "Oh," says the propagandist, 
"the man who gets $100,000 will be displaced and we will put a man in for 
$5,000 who will do his work." Will any of the $95,000 fall into your pockets 
by way of reduced price? We'll, some of it may, on the surface of things, but 
let me tell you this: A loose-jointed, badly-run Governn1ent industry will 
result, and while you don't pay it in the price of gasoline you will pay it not 
21 Pearson and Allen, Nine Old Men, p. 146. 
22 George Wharton Pepper, Philadelphia Lawyer, (Philadelphia: lB. Lippencott Co.,1944), p. 197. 
only on the gasoline you buy in taxes but you will pay the other fellow's 
gasoline in the taxes that you yourself pay. 
What is the answer? Are we prepared to revise our ideas of 
government? Are we prepared to go into a frank state of socialism in this 
country, with all that it means in the suppression of ambition, in the deterrence 
of industry, in the holding back of men who want to arrange their affairs for 
their good and the economic good, then for the good of us all--are we to go 
into a state of socialism, or are you men and men like you, who form the public 
opinion of this country, prepared to get out, take off your coats, and root for 
old-fashioned, Anglo-Saxon individualism, where a man does not have to 
figure how, first of all, he can do a perfectly honorable business thing without 
first calculating what all the prohibitory statutes say?23 
Despite this significant revelation, Pepper made an "earnest plea" on the Senate floor in 
support of Roberts, defending him by noting that he had won a $55,000 personal injury 
lawsuit against the Reading Railroad.24 Roberts nomination was approved by the Senate 
without major opposition, and his stint as a government prosecutor was largely successful. 
Pepper noted in his autobiography that the public was greatly pleased with his work, a fact 
which contributed to his appeal as a Supreme Court nominee.25 
Roberts's speech can surely be viewed as one typical of a corporate attorney, of one 
also accustomed to large salaries, and of one attempting to engage an audience full of 
businessmen.26 It is usually considered as a foreshadow of Owen Roberts, the conservative 
Supreme Court Justice. Pearson and Allen referred to Roberts as the "biggest joke ever 
played upon the fighting liberals of the United States Senate," saying that if liberals in power 
had only bothered to check into his background they could have foreseen his conservative 
judicial philosophy.27 Another historian, though, has made the thoughtful comment that 
23 Congressional Record-Senate, 68 th Cong., 1 st Sess., voL 65, pt. 3, 1924: p.2563. 
24 Pepper, Philadelphia Lawyer, p. 198; Burner, "Owen J. Roberts," p. 2255. 
25 Pepper, Philadelphia Lawyer, p. 231. 
26 Roberts's income was approximately $150,000 a year. Pearson and Allen, Nine Old Men, p. 150. 
27 Ibid., p. 139. 
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Roberts's remarks, if they are read in context, are "no more illiberal that the position taken by 
Mr. Justice Brandeis whose opposition to bigness in government, including the early New 
Deal measures, as well as to business, is well known.,,28 
Though the context of his speech may somewhat soften his arguments, one cannot 
ignore the passion and zeal with which Roberts delivered these words. Indeed, he prompted 
the audience to "take off your coats, and root for old-fashioned Anglo-Saxon individualism," 
as if the rising tide of social reform during the 1920s was a disastrous threat to American 
individualism. More importantly, he referred to his audience as "men like you, who form the 
public opinion of this country," revealing an elitism on the part of the future justice. The 
businessmen of corporate America, in Roberts's opinion, had a .firm grip on the rest of the 
nation economically and politically as well, since they could "forrh" public opinion. 
Owen Roberts was suggested to Hoover for a Supreme Court appointment in 1930 by 
Attorney General William D. Mitchell.29 He was not Hoover's first choice. Judge John J. 
Parker, a North Carolina Republican, was nominated first for the seat left vacant by the 
unexpected death of Justice Edward T. Sanford of Tennessee. However, Judge Parker had 
made some public slurs against black political activists, and he had issued some anti-labor 
injunctions as a federal judge, two things which spelled death for his confirmation effort in the 
Senate. Liberals in the Senate had weathered an exhaustive and unsucessful fight to oppose 
the nomination of Chief Justice Hughes a year earlier, and they were determined to assert their 
strength by defeating Parker's nomination. On May 7, 1930, the Senate rejected Parker's 
28 Leonard, Search For a Judicial Philosophy, p. 10. 
29 Ibid., p. 7. 
nomination by a vote of 39 to 41.30 Historians have since noted Parker's liberal judicial 
record in the years following his rejection. Rodell has stated that Judge Parker, as compared 
to Roberts, went on to have an "outstandingly" liberal judicial record for twenty-five years 
afterward.3l Leonard has noted that Judge Parker wrote the lower court opinion in the 
famously liberal civil rights case Barnett v. West Virginia [47 F Sup 251 (1942)], a case the 
Supreme Court later upheld in which school rules requiring flag salutes were deemed 
unconstitutional. 32 
On May 9, two days after Parker's rejection, Hoover submitted Roberts's name to the 
Senate. Pepper stated in his autobiography that there was "widespread demand" for Roberts 
as a Supreme Court nominee. Curiously, he also stated that Roberts had "begged his friends 
not to press for consideration of his name," and that he was happy practicing law. 33 Roberts 
was, no doubt, happy with the comfortable lifestyle which his law practice afforded him. 
Pepper continued in language that reveals pride in his protege: "Nevertheless, public 
sentiment was so strong and his qualifications so obvious ... he felt bound to accept." Pepper 
then closed this topic by trying hard, too hard, to discredit the rumor that politics, or perhaps 
the "University Crowd," had brought Roberts the nomination: "This simple statement of fact 
ought to dispel the mistaken impression that Roberts's influential friends were instrumental in 
bringing about his appointment. ,,34 Liberals in the Senate found little or no qualms with 
Roberts, and the American Federation of Labor came out in support of him because he had 
30Cari Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development, 2nd Ed., (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 
1954), Pp. 776-779. 
31 Nine Men, p. 222. 
32 Search For a Judicial Philosophy, p. 6. 
33 Pepper, Philadelphia Lawyer, p. 231. 
34 Ibid., p. 231. 
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charged nominal fees to labor leaders in his private practice.35 On June 2, his nomination was 
confirmed by the Senate with no dissenting votes. 
While Roberts found himself in a new job, the country found itself in the grips of the 
Great Depression. The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt brought an unprecendented amount 
of social and economic reform. It was only a matter of time before these new laws would be 
subject to judicial scrutiny. It was not certain how Roberts would view the new progressive 
legislation emanating from federal and state legislatures: Though he was a fornler corporate 
attorney, he had been successful at prosecuting cases for the government. Would he join the 
"Four Horsemen," or would he vote liberally? Fortune magazine referred to him as an 
"important question mark.,,36 Carl Brent Swisher has referred to the confusion following 
Roberts's appointment by saying that "like Chief Justice Hughes, he avoided all attempts at 
easy classification. He moved back and forth between groups with an agility bewildering to 
those who sought to predict his conduct.,,37 
The first case which gave some indication of how Justice Roberts would react to the 
New Deal involved a state statute rather than a federal one. Nebbia v. New York [291 US 502 
(1934)] involved a challenge to a New York law which had set a minimum price for the sale 
of milk. New York had created a board to investigate trade practices which had caused the 
price of milk to fall more drastically than other agricultural products, so much so that "the 
situation of the families of dairy producers had become desperate and called for state aid 
similar to that afforded the unemployed, if conditions should not improve.,,38 The board 
recommended a minimum price for the sale of milk at nine cents per quart. Nebbia, a 
35 Burner, "Owen J. Roberts," p. 2255. 
36 "Mr. Justice Roberts," Fortune XIII (May, 1936): 192. 
37 American Constitutional Development, p. 779. 
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Rochester grocer, had sold two quarts of milk and a five cent loaf of bread for a total of 
eighteen cents, and was convicted for violating the law. He challenged the state's authority to 
set minimum prices in a private industry, claiming that such regulation violated the equal 
protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
One report has it that Roberts paced the floor of his home during the early morning 
hours, trying to decide which way he would vote in the case?9 After weighing the issues, 
," 
Roberts decided to join Hughes and the liberals in upholding the right of New York to set 
minimum prices for the sale of milk. In conference, he was assigned to write the opinion by 
the Chief Justice. The opinion which he wrote has been called the most liberal of his entire 
career.40 After dispensing easily with the equal protection argument of Nebbia, he addresserl 
the main issue of due process. Did a substantive view of the due process clause hinder states 
from interfering with the property of shopkeepers, distributors, and dairy farmers by 
regulating the prices at which they could sell their product? Roberts did not duck this 
question in the least; indeed, he answered it quite definitively: 
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of 
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The 
general rule is that both shall be free of govermental interference. But neither 
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if 
the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or 
exercise his freedom of contract to work Jhem harm.41 
38 (291 US 502), p. 515. 
39 Merlo Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 700. 
40 Rodell, Nine Men, p. 230. 
41 (291 US 502), p. 523. 
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He further stated that the states, as sovereign governments, had an inherent power to promote 
the general welfare of citizens through laws. The only demands of due process are that those 
laws must not be "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.,,42 
Roberts's opinion was regarded as good news for the Roosevelt administration, which 
after the haste of the "Hundred Days" sessions had only begun to consider the constitutional 
issues involved. A University of Pennsylvania Law Review article referred to the case as a 
"milestone" and stated that it marked "distinctly a change from recent conceptions of due 
process.,,43 Perhaps directly referring to the Court's 1923 decision in Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital [261 US 525], the article stated that the decision made it possible for a state to 
regulate wages for labor, since the definition of due process was significantly narrowed.44 
This case, however, could not be viewed as a definite sign that the Court was willing to accept 
the New Deal, for it dealt with a state statute and not a federal one. Justices who would 
approve of states enacting laws under an inherent "police power" could certainly be reluctant 
to extend that authority to a massive federal government. Nonetheless, law reviews were 
generally optimistic that this meant good news for the New Deal. "The Court having gone 
back to the early decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, may well return for support to 
the early decisions under the 'commerce clause', many of which, beginning with Gibbons v. 
Ogden [22 US 1 (1824)], upheld the theory of a wider federal control.,,45 
The law reviews of the time overlooked certain passages of Roberts's opinion which, 
given the benefits of hindsight, are telling. Though he concluded by saying that such laws 
42 Ibid., p. 525 
43 Morris Duane, "Nebbia v. People: A Milestone," University of Pennsylvania Law Review LXXXII (1934): 
619. 
44 Ibid., p. 622. 
45 Ibid., p. 623. 
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pass the due process test unless they are "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant 
to the policy the legislature is free to adopt,,,46 he had earlier qualified this statement by saying 
that the degree of reasonableness to be reached depended on the facts of each case. "It results 
that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for 
another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness 
of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts.,,47 This statement seems to mitigate the 
broad statements concerning state police power and due process which Roberts made 
throughout the rest of the opinion. Roberts was saying, in effect, that the Court shall always 
have the final word regarding due process when it convenes to consider the "relevant facts." 
In truth, the relevant facts are whichever ones the justices consider to be relevant. 
In this case, Roberts considered the relevant facts to be that unfair trade practices and 
price-cutting tactics in the milk. industry had caused milk prices to fall dramatically. Large 
milk distributors and their suppliers were put at a disadvantage because they, due to the nature 
of milk consunlption, had to maintain a surplus milk supply of about twenty percent, while 
smaller firms did not. The profits realized from these large surpluses were often diminished 
because of spoilage. The state of New York wasjustified, therefore, in setting minimum milk 
prices because stability would allow the large distributors to operate comfortably with 
surpluses, thereby eliminating any temptation to sell contaminated milk and increase profits.48 
The widespread sale of contaminated milk, of course, would seriously threaten the public 
health, which New York had an interest in maintaining. 
46 (291 US 502), p. 539. 
47 Ibid., p.525. 
48 Ibid" p. 517-518. 
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Though Roberts sustained the law and gave indications that he would vote liberally in 
New Deal cases, this may serve as evidence that the corporate mentality was still very much 
alive in him. His view of the "relevant facts" leads one to believe that Roberts validated the 
law more because of compassion for large milk distributors who felt threatened rather than a 
sincere belief in the sovereignty of states to exercise such an authority. 
Part II: Justice Roberts and the federal New Deal 
The optimism of the Roosevelt administration that a majority of the justices would 
uphold New Deal laws, albeit a slim majority, was soon shattered. The Court's rejection of 
New Deal laws is well-documented and will not be discussed in-depth here. However, it is 
important to mentiorl that most scholars, recognizing the importance of judicial review, 
believe that the Court did a good job fulfilling its duty reviewing the New Deal laws. Merlo 
Pusey, Hughes's biographer, has commented that "no court could have accepted all the 
undigested and ill-founded legislation of that period without abdicating its constitutional 
function.,,49 Moreover, not every decision which voided a New Deal statute involved a 5-4 
majority. Of the twelve decisions that voided federal legislation, six of them were unanimous, 
while two were 8_1.50 The Court's problems, then, resulted from decisions that seemed to be 
extreme efforts to strike down economic and social legislation in favor of the laissez-faire 
philosophy which had dominated the Court since the nineteenth century. Many thought that 
the Court's reasoning processes had become convoluted and were manipulated. "No Supreme 
49 Charles Evans Hughes, vol. 2, 747. 
50 Ibid., p. 747. 
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Court justice can define 'due process' other than to say that the words are used to strike down 
a law which he does not like."sl 
Roberts, with corporate interests still in mind, authored two opinions for the Court 
striking down federal New Deal laws which invited such criticism. Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Alton [295 US 330 (1935)] and United States v. Butler [297 US 1 (1936)] will be 
discussed in this section. Together, these cases demonstrate Roberts's increasingly elitist and 
corporatist economic views as well as his ability to reason judicially in favor of those views. 
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton (hereafter referred to as the Rail Pension case) 
involved a challenge to the New Deal program created to provide a pension system for the 
nation's railroad employees. The Railroad Retirement Act was intended to breathe more life 
into the suffering rail industry by allowing older employees to retire with pensions while 
younger men who were seeking employment could take their positions.52 The law was 
heralded by rail workers and their powerful lobbies. The large railroad carriers were 
understandably opposed, since the pension system was to be funded by compulsory employer-
employee contributions. Each rail carrier was required to contribute twice the amount which 
its employees contributed. 53 The decision was, no doubt, also viewed as a preliminary test of 
how the Supreme Court would rule on the impending Social Security Act. 
Roberts, despite his conflict of interest stemming from prior work for railroad 
companies, heard the case and wrote an opinion which in every conceivable way validated the 
interests of the rail carriers while subjugating those of rail employees. He dutifully noted at 
51 Maury Maverick, A Maverick American, (New York: Covici, Friede, 1937), p. 302. 
52 For a more in-depth discussion of the Railroad Retirement Act, see William Leuchtenburg, "Mr. Justice 
Roberts and the Railroaders," The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of 
Roosevelt, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Pp. 26-51. 
53 (295 US 330), p. 334. 
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the outset that the "pertinent provision of the Constitution is Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, 
which confers power on the Congress 'To regulate Commerce ... among the several States ... '; 
and that this power must be exercised in subjection to the guarantee of due process of law 
found in the Fifth Amendment. ,,54 From this straightforward introduction setting forth the 
issues to be resolved, Roberts then exploded in a diatribe upon the specific provisions of the 
act. He criticized vehemently a retroactive clause which allowed persons who had been 
employed up to one year prior to the act's passage to collect pensions. "About 146,000 
persons fall within this class, which, as found below, includes those who have been 
discharged for cause, who have been retired, who have resigned to take other gainful 
employment, who have been discharged because their positions were abolished, who were 
temporarily employed, or who left the service for other reasons.,,55 Roberts flatly rejected the 
argument of the government that the clause was intended to give pension benefits to those 
employees on furlough and subject to call. He also found the government's contention that 
the act would promote efficiency and safety in the railroad industry by improving morale to be 
"without support in reason or common sense.,,56 
His opinion in this case is especially important for two reasons. First, it shows, at best, 
a very sympathetic attitude towards the large railroads, and, at worst, a propensity for social 
darwinism. His entire opinion focused only the few rail employees who were likely to abuse 
the law, rather than the hundreds of thousands who had served faithfully and were perhaps 
entitled to such benefits. In short, it betrays an unsympathetic view toward the needs of the 
laboring classes. Roberts discussed the fact that an employee could "take a position with a 
54 Ibid., p. 347. 
55 Ibid., p. 348. 
56 Ibid., p. 349. 
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carrier at twenty, remain until he is thirty, resign after gaining valuable skill and aptitude for 
his work, enter a more lucrative profession, and, though never thereafter in carrier employ, at 
65 receive a pension calculated on his ten years of service.,,57 Not minding the facts that the 
above employee had paid portions of his salary into the pension fund and that his pension was 
calculated only upon his ten years of contribution, Roberts viewed this hypothetical man as 
ungrateful, disloyal, and undeserving of the benefits bestowed upon him by the law. 
Furthermore, even if providing old age security to these men improved their morale, increased 
their efficiency, and engaged their loyalties, it would "substitute legislative largess for private 
bounty and thus transfer the drive for pensions to the halls of Congress and transmute loyalty 
to employer into gratitude to the legislature.,,58 These laborers, in Roberts's view, had an 
obligation to be loyal to their employers regardless of whether or not they received pensions. 
They were not entitled to federally guaranteed old-age security because it would undermine 
the seemingly feudal relationship between them and their employers. 
Secondly, Roberts stated in his memorandum to Justice Frankfurter, which will be 
discussed later, that when the Court heard the Tipaldo case one year later in 1936, he was 
prepared to overrule the Adkins decision outright. 59 In other words, he was prepared to rule 
that minimum wage laws were not in violation of substantive due process, and that the 
freedom of contract between employer and employee was not an inherent freedom guaranteed 
by the Constitution. However, in the Rail Pension case, Roberts gives no indication that he 
would ever rule as such. In fact, given the tone of his opinion and the hypothetical situations 
he devised, his vote in the Tipaldo case seems a predictable one. Besides referring to 
57 Ibid., p. 351. 
58 Ibid., p. 351. 
59 See Appendix A. 
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thousands of rail employees as "unfaithful," he concluded that parts of the pension law altered 
the "contractual rights" of employers and employees.6o 
Justice Roberts soon authored another opinion which struck down a federal New Deal 
statute. United States v. Butler [297 US 53 (1936)] involved a challenge to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, and was "probably the most troublesome case the Court had to deal with" 
during the New Deal years.61 The specifics of the act or the case itself are not central to this 
discussion. However, it is important to note generally that the main issue of the case was 
whether or not the A.A.A. program quotas were voluntary.62 The quotas were production 
amounts assigned to various commodities by the Department of Agriculture. While farmers 
were not legally required to abide by the quotas, they could choose to do so, and in return they 
would receive a subsidy, funded by an agricultural processing tax. The three most liberal 
justices found the program quotas to be adequately voluntary. The other six, including 
Roberts and the Chief Justice, found that the nature of the agricultural sector made such 
program quotas almost binding. Merlo Pusey wrote that Hughes, who at first was unwilling, 
ruled with the majority only after persuading them to accept the Hamiltonian thesis that the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and spend for the general welfare beyond the 
enumerated powers.63 
For the purposes of this study, it is most important to note the condemnation which 
Roberts's opinion received throughout the legal community. Many scholars criticized the 
logic by which Roberts had reached his conclusions. Dr. Howard Lee McBain, constitutional 
law professor at Columbia, stated that "one can hardly escape the conclusion that the Court 
60 (295 US 330), p. 349. 
61 Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, vol. 2, p. 743. 
62 Ibid., p. 744. 
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was determined to kill this law no matter what sacrifice of logic and reasoning was necessary 
in the process of torturing the Constitution to that end. ,,64 A prominent Republican and 
former Senator remarked: "I agree with Mr. Roberts's conclusions, but I wish to God he'd 
written a better opinion.,,65 Perhaps the most revealing criticism came in the form of a 
parody: In a celebrated mock opinion published by the Harvard Law Review, Henry M. Hart, 
Jr. used Roberts's reasoning in the Butler case to invalidate the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 
1930.66 The power of the Congress to impose tariffs is, of course, unquestionably provided 
for by the Constitution.67 This only serves to make the parody more relevant, for it shows that 
some were questioning the traditional process of constitutional interpretation. An important 
question, though, which was not asked very loudly by critics of the time concerned Roberts 
and a potential conflict of interest: The attorney who argued for Butler against the A.A.A. 
was none other than George Wharton Pepp~r of Philadelphia. 
Part III: Justice Roberts and the Elections of 1936 
The Butler decision was handed down at the beginning of 1936, an election year. 
While the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1936 are noted throughout history for 
the incredible Roosevelt-Democratic landslide which occurred, it must be realized that such 
events were not obvious to contemporary observers. This is true especially in the times before 
the sophisticated science of political polling, which was just being developed during the 
1930s. The year that began with Roberts's extremely conservative Butler decision ended on a 
63 Ibid., p. 743. 
64 As quoted in Pearson and Allen, Nine Old Men, p. 158-159. 
65 Ibid., p. 159. 
66 Henry M. Hart, Jr., "Processing Taxes and Protective Tariffs," Harvard Law Review, XLIX (1936): 610-618. 
67 Article I, Section 8 
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rather different note. In the middle of the year, Roberts and the rest of the Court experienced 
public criticism such as they never had before due to the Tipaldo decision. 
In 1934, a group of wealthy businessmen, financiers, professionals, and lawyers came 
together to fonn the American Liberty League.68 Generally, the Liberty League was 
committed to making the Constitution and the New Deal an issue in the upcoming election of 
1936. However, it was not an organization that endeavored simply to protect the Constitution. 
George W olfskill, an expert on the League, has remarked that "it is perhaps no exaggeration 
to say that not in the history of the country did one organization marshal so much prestige, 
wealth, and managerial skill to undo a President as the Liberty League did in the fight against 
Roosevelt and the New Deal.,,69 Newsweek magazine commented that "The Tories have come 
out of ambush. ,,70 Stopping short of nominating candidates for public office, the League 
published a series of pamphlets and held speeches and press conferences in support of its 
cause. One such pamphlet was issued criticizing the Roosevelt administration for 
emphasizing dissenting opinions of the Court. They said that such strategies were "prejudicial 
attempts" to undermine the Court's rulings.7! 
Only one scholar of this controversy, Fred Rodell, has given any significant attention 
to the Liberty League's role within Roberts's thinking.72 Rodell has concluded that Roberts 
was attentive to the Liberty League's public campaign, and that the Liberty League stimulated 
him to consider his political ambitions. Though he cites no specific evidence, Rodell has 
claimed that Roberts secretly desired to run for the Republican nomination for President in 
68 For a complete look at the Liberty League, see George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives: A History 
of the American Liberty League, 1934-1940, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962). 
69 Ib'd ... I ., p. Vlll. 
70 As quoted in Ibid., p. 29. 
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1936. With the Liberty League's resources and its emphasis on "saving" the Constitution, 
Roberts perhaps thought that he, as a staunch defender of the Constitution in the Courts, 
would have an excellent shot at running for President. 
Since Rodell has not cited specific evidence to support such a claim, it is worthwhile 
to examine the situation and take account of the primary evidence which could point to such a 
conclusion. First, as has been demonstrated earlier, Roberts was an ambitious man who took 
his career and professional life seriously. However, his professional ambitions must have 
been tempered somewhat by a desire for public service. In 1924, while Roberts was 
approaching the age of fifty, he decided to forsake his high salary and become a prosecutor for 
the government. By contrast, in 1930 he reportedly did not wish to be nominated to the 
Supreme Court, a fact which some may find difficult to imagine. A justiceship on the 
Supreme Court is considered the pinnacle of any legal career. Was Roberts perhaps interested 
in another pinnacle? It must be remembered that only one other person had attempted to run 
for the Presidency while on the Court: Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes had lost to 
Woodrow Wilson in 1916, reportedly by only 4,000 votes in California.73 Hughes's close 
contest with Wilson may have reminded Roberts that, although it was difficult to seek higher 
office while on the Court, it was not impossible. 
There is evidence that Roberts was cognizant of his situation. In 1954, an amendment 
to the Constitution was proposed that would have prohibited justices of the Court from 
running for President or Vice-President until five years had passed from the time of their 
resignation. While the specifics of the amendment were being debated in Congress, a retired 
71 "Assails New Deal Record: Liberty League Issues Pamphlet on Anniversary ofNRA decision," The New York 
Times, 28 May 1936, p.2, coL2. 
72 Rodell, Nine Men, p. 240. 
Justice Roberts testified before a Senate subcommittee on the Judiciary in support of the 
proposal. An excerpt from the testimony is as follows: 
I hope that I will be excused from naming names, but it is a matter of 
common knowledge that ambition to go from the Court to the Chief Executive 
of the Government has hurt the work of a number of men on the Court. 
Only once has that occurred. As you know, my great Chief Justice 
Hughes yielded to almost the clamor of his party. After declaring that he 
would not leave the Bench for any other office, that he was not a candidate for 
the Presidency of the United States, a convention of the Republican Party 
almost riotously and by clamor nominated him unanimously for the Presidency 
of the United States and he was confronted with the question as to whether he 
should repudiate the party which had honored him over his life or whether he 
should yield, and he yielded. 
I think that he ought not to have been subjected to that pressure. 
But the contrary has been true of a number of Justices, Chief and 
Associate, of the Supreme Court. They have had in the back of their minds a 
possibility that they might get the nomination for President. Now, that is not a 
healthy situation because, however strong a man's mentality and character, if 
he has this ambition in his mind it may tinge or color what he does, and that is 
exactly what the Founding Fathers wanted to remove from the minds of the 
Supreme Court, to make them perfectly free knowing that there was no more in 
life for them than the work of the Court. 
Roberts continued his testimony with the following remarks, which seem to be an attempt to 
make sure that no one could accuse him of such ambition: 
I happen to have a personal knowledge of what that pressure is like, for 
twice ill-advised but enthusiastic friends of nune urged me to let my name go 
up as a candidate for President while I was on the Court. Of course, I turned a 
hard face on that thing. I never had the notion in my mind. 
Men ought not to have the notion in their minds and ought not to be 
subject to those pressures. Chief Justice Hughes ought not to have been 
practically sandbagged into becoming a candidate for President. .. 
Now, I do not need to refer to the Court-packing plan which was 
resorted to when I was a member of the Court. Apart from the tremendous 
strain and threat to the existing Court, of which I was fully conscious, it is 
obviously, if ever resorted to, a political device to influence the Court and to 
73 Ibid., p. 240. 
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pack it so as to be in conformity with the views of the Executive, or the 
Congress, or both.74 
The interesting element of his testimony is not only his insistent denial that he had 
23 
ever considered running for President, but the order in which he arranged his ideas. After the 
denial, he said that Hughes should not have been "sandbagged" into running for President in 
1916, but then he skipped almost directly to a discussion of Roosevelt's court-packing 
proposal over twenty years later. Following his train of thought, it can be logically concluded 
that Roberts associated the idea of justices of the Court running for the Presidency with the 
controversy in 1937. Why he would do so is unclear unless, perhaps, he was considering 
running for President during the time. 
The primary evidence that Roberts was a viable candidate is sketchy but still 
significant. The Fortune magazine feature of Roberts in May, 1936, stated that when it 
seemed that the Constitution would be a major issue during the 1936 campaign, that 
"considerable talk" of Roberts as a viable candidate began to circulate. However, the article 
also stated that when Roberts was asked the question after the Rail Pension case was handed 
down, he replied, "I figure that would cost about 3,000,000 votes." The article also said that 
Roberts laughed at the question because he had "no thought of cultivating" supporters for a 
Presidential candidacy?5 The New York Times reported on May 30 that Roberts was set to 
receive a "favorite son" vote by the Pennsylvania delegation at the Republican convention to 
be held in June.76 Pennsylvania's electoral votes at the time were the second largest in the 
74 "Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on The Judiciary on Senate Joint Resolution 44," United 
States Senate, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 29 January 1954, p. 9. 
75 "Mr. Justice Roberts," Fortune, XIII (May, 1936): 194. 
76 "Roberts a 'Favorite Son,'" New York Times, 30 May 1936, p.3, coLI. 
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electoral college.77 Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen wrote in their contemporary book on 
the Court that Roberts was afflicted with "presidentitis" and that he had an excellent chance at 
achieving the high office due to his "youth, health, great ability, rare charm, and a convincing, 
powerful personality.,,78 This evidence, though it is circumstantial and subject to criticism, 
does show that Roberts would have been a viable candidate for the Presidency in 1936 and, 
despite his insistent denial, that he may have considered the notion in the "back or' his mind. 
Having established this situation, the question now is this: What occurred to prevent 
Roberts from running for President? If he had wanted to run in 1936 he would have begun 
preparations several months prior, so it is safe to conclude that he did not seriously intend to 
run. Pearson and Allen stated that Robert's domineering wife had made the decision for him 
not to run, telling other members of the family that "Owen's duty is to use his position to 
stabilize the country.,,79 To her, stabilizing the country probably meant guarding it against 
the New Deal, and Roberts's vote in the Supreme Court had proven to be an effective 
safeguard, more powerful than any presidential veto. If Roberts were to use his vote wisely in 
this regard, he would naturally become more respected by Republican party leaders. Such 
loyalty would perhaps bring executive appointments, cabinet posts, and greater influence. 
Because there is no direct evidence that Roberts desired to attract the attention of Republican 
leaders, this assertion is speculative; however, with Roberts's ambitious past and early career 
in mind, one can easily infer that he had contemplated the power he wielded as a Supreme 
Court justice and the effect which his votes carried with the businessmen of the country. 
77 Pearson and Allen, Nine Old Men, p. 161. 
78 Ibid., p. 140, 161. 
79 Ibid., P. 162. 
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If Roberts considered his votes carefully to that end, he made a critical misstep in the 
summer of 1936, one week before the Republican convention, and at a time when the Liberty 
League's constitutional cries were loudest. As stated previously, New York v. Morehead ex 
reI. Tipaldo [298 US 587 (1936)] involved a New York minimum wage law for women and 
minors. Roberts voted to strike down the law, perhaps because he was attempting to 
"stabilize the country." This vote was a misstep, though, because the Court's ruling in the 
Tipaldo case was subsequently criticized by Democrats and Republicans alike. One historian 
has concluded that "more than any other decision by the Court during the New Deal period, 
Morehead unleashed a barrage of criticism from conservatives as well as liberals."so The New 
York Times, by no means an enthusiastic supporter of the New Deal, called the decision 
"unfortunate in more than one respect."Sl In an editorial entitled "A Deplorable Decision," 
the Catholic publication Commonweal stated that "when five justices of the Supreme Court 
decided to outlaw the New York minimum wage law for women, they did something to public 
opinion which is comparable - we do not say equivalent - to a few activities by Louis 
XVI. .. There is nowhere in any Catholic or Christian system of morality any room whatever 
for a conunendation of the minimum wage decision."s2 The New Republic, in an editorial 
entitled "Liberty to Starve," quoted at length from the minority opinion of Justice Stone and 
then stated that "the majority of the Court ... are the dictators of our form of government."S3 
The Court had decided a minimum wage case thirteen years earlier. Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital [261 US 525 (1923)] involved a minimum wage law which Congress had 
enacted for women and minors within the District of Columbia. Justice Sutherland had 
80 Irons, New Deal Lawyers, p. 278. 
81 2 June 1936, p. 26, col. 1. 
82 19 June 1936, p. 199. 
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authored the opinion which endorsed a substantive view of the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment: "That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by this clause, is settled by the decisions of this Court and is no longer 
open to question ... Within this liberty are contracts of employment of labor. In making such 
contracts, generally speaking, the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best 
tenns they can as the result of private bargaining.,,84 The law in this case provided for the 
establishment of a commission to determine wages adequate enough to "supply the necessary 
cost of living to any such women workers to maintain them in good health and to protect their 
morals.,,85 Especially critical of what he considered to be an arbitrary exercise of government 
control, Sutherland stated that a statute which proscribed the payment of minimum wages 
without regard to the value of the services rendered for the wage was clearly 
unconstitutional. 86 
The state of New York and its counsel were aware of the Court's Adkins decision, and 
its 1936 law was carefully drafted in response to the criticisms put forth by the Court in 1923. 
While the Adkins law had merely dictated that a "living wage" be paid by employers, the New 
York law added a "fair wage" component that directly tied the minimum wage to the value of 
service provided by the wage earner.87 The state of New York was cautious in its arguments 
before the Court, stating that the Court need not overrule the Adkins case in order to validate 
its law. The New York law was written so that it could be distinguished from the earlier 
8310June 1936,p.l17. 
84 (261 US 525), p. 545. 
85 Ibid., p. 540. 
86 Ibid., p. 559. 
87 Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, p. 701; (298 US 587), p. 593. 
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Adkins law.88 Indeed, it seems that the law was written specifically with the conservative 
Court in mind. The Court, however, dismissed such reasoning, and as one historian has 
written, "Justice Butler went on to reassert the 'liberty of contract' doctrine in its most arid 
and pristine laissez-faire fonn. ,,89 
Justice Roberts voted with Butler and the other three horsemen in this case, although it 
significantly contradicted his earlier opinion in the Nebbia case. There, Roberts had endorsed 
a broad state police power and had encouraged a narrower definition of due process clause. 
Here, he voted in favor of broad due process and limited state police power. Chief Justice 
Hughes dissented in an opinion which found that the New York law was distinguishable from 
Adkins and should therefore be upheld. In a separate, vigorous dissent joined by Brandeis and 
Cardozo, Justice Stone advocated overruling Adkins altogether. The most vicious criticism 
for the majority came through in these words: 
It is not for the courts to resolve doubts whether the remedy by wage 
regulation is as efficacious as many believe, or is better than some other, or is 
better even than the blind operation of uncontrolled economic forces. The 
legislature must be free to choose unless government is to be rendered 
impotent. The Fourteenth Amendment has no more embedded in the 
Constitution our preference for some particular set of economic beliefs than it 
has adopted, in the name of liberty, the system of theology which we may 
happen to approve. 
Justice Stone concluded the words above by stating that the Court should "follow our decision 
in the Nebbia case" and grant discretion to legislatures in solving their social and economic 
concerns.
90 
Roberts must have voted with his future political career in mind. Though Mr. Tipaldo, 
the owner of a Brooklyn laundry house, was not a corporate mogul like the ones Roberts had 
88 (298 US 587), p. 593. 
89 Irons, New Deal Lawyers, p. 277. 
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faithfully represented, big business would ultimately be pleased by the decision. Moreover, 
the wealthy patrons of the Liberty League would be rallied by the Court's refusal to see the 
Constitution as Roosevelt and other progressives did. The League could then bring that 
excitement to the Republican convention, and Roberts's name would be on their lips as the 
man who saved their cause. 
Roberts apparently made a tactical error, for as demonstrated previously, criticism of 
the decision seemed to hail from all corners of the country. Moreover, the decision seemed to 
create a "no-man's land" in which neither federal government nor state governments could 
legislate. Merlo Pusey has eloquently commented that "the Court's revolt against innovation 
reached its climax in the Tipaldo case ... Having blocked an orderly evolution of federal powe~ 
in the name of states' rights, the majority suddenly turned and clamped the states themselves 
in the irons of standpattism.,,91 Fred Rodell, the Yale law professor and historian who 
originally stated that Roberts had considered running for President, has written that unlike the 
federal New Deal laws, the New York law was not a "visionary product of professors and 
other brain-trusters who swarmed around that 'traitor to his class' in the White House." It was 
instead a "carefully drafted, badly needed law that had been backed by Republicans as well as 
Democrats in the nation's most heavily peopled state." He wrote further that after Tipaldo, 
the "fervor of a save-the-Constitution crusade to stop Roosevelt's re-election simmered down; 
the Liberty League lost some of its luster; the Republican nomination went, not to Roberts, 
but to unjudging and almost unknown Alf Landon of Kansas.,,92 Of course, the nomination of 
Landon as the Republican candidate cannot be tied to the Tipaldo case decided merely a week 
90 (298 us 587), p. 636. 
91 Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, p. 746. 
92 Rodell, Nine Men, p. 242. 
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earlier. However, the Republican convention did respond to the case in its platform, stating 
that it would encourage state minimum wage laws and that "we believe that this can be done 
within the Constitution as it now stands.,,93 By then, it seemed, even the Republican party 
was reluctant to be identified with a Supreme Court that ignored the social and economic 
necessities of life in the 1930s in favor of a dated, 19th Century economic philosophy. 
The Tipaldo decision can therefore be considered as an extreme attempt by the 
majority of the Court to thwart liberal objectives, and Roberts joined the majority with the 
misguided hope of gaining further political viability. He most likely did not expect a 
Roosevelt landslide in November 1936. The Literary Digest remarked, as it published its 
presidential poll in the summer predicting Landon would defeat Roosevelt, that "not since 
Hughes battled Wilson in 1916 have the lines been so sharply drawn, the outcome so in 
doubt.,,94 That widely-read prediction could not have been more false, for the results show 
only a resounding victory for Roosevelt: Roosevelt received 27.8 million popular votes while 
Landon garnered 16.7 million. In the electoral college, Roosevelt won 46 states with a total of 
523 votes while Landon captured only Maine and Vermont with a total of eight. Coupled 
with a resoun,ding Democratic Congressional victory as well, these results must have given 
Roberts reason to reconsider his vote. 
Part IV: Justice Roberts and the "Switch" 
Roberts would not have to wait long for an opportunity to correct himself. In October 
the Court convened to consider petitions filed during the summer. The state of New York had 
93 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968, vol. 3, (New York: 
Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), p. 2859. 
94 As quoted in William E. Leuchtenburg, "Election of 1936," ibid., p. 2809. 
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petitioned the Court for a rehearing of the Tipaldo case. Though the Court denied the petition, 
it did grant a writ of certiorari in another minimum wage case. The West Coast Hotel 
Company had been sued by Elsie Parrish, a former chambermaid, for $216.19 in back pay, 
money which she claimed was due her because the hotel had not paid her the minimum wage 
according to Washington state law. The Washington Supreme Court had ruled in favor of 
Parrish, and, unlike New York, had definitely assailed the Adkins precedent.95 It would be in 
this case, then, that Justice Roberts would perform his "switch." Representative Maury 
Maverick, in an excellent contemporary account from the Court's chambers on March 29, 
1937, the day the Parrish decision was announced, called it the "Greatest Constitutional 
Somersault in History. For Owen Roberts, one single human being, had amended the 
Constitution of the United States by nodding his head instead of shaking it. The lives of 
millions were changed by this nod.,,96 
Roberts's switch did not go unnoticed by the public. The Nation, in an article entitled 
"Is the Supreme Court Going Liberal?" expressed gladness that the Court had upheld the 
Washington law, but also stated that the "liberal margin of advantage is the margin of Justice 
Roberts's very changeable mind. That is not a sturdy enough peg on which to hang the 
garment of one's hopes." The magazine also stated what was to become a common belief: 
that Roberts had changed his vote in response to Roosevelt's court-packing plan which had 
been announced nearly two months earlier. "We find ... that whatever we may say or think of 
judicial independence, the Supreme Court does actually in its functioning operate within the 
95 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish [300 US 379 (1937)], Pp. 389-390. 
96 Maverick, Maverick American, p. 332. 
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ambit of political considerations. Such a day of decisions would not have been possible 
before the court faced the threat of the President's reorganization proposal.,,97 
It was in response to such criticism that Roberts composed his memorandum 
explaining his switch to Justice Frankfurter eight years later.98 In the memorandum, Roberts 
contended that he was prepared to overrule the Adkins decision outright in Tipaldo, but since 
New York argued that its law was distinguishable from Adkins, he was unable to validate the 
law on such shaky judicial grounds. Peter Irons has called this reasoning "disingenuous" 
because, he says, no rule of judicial process has ever prevented the Court from deciding cases 
on constitutional grounds other than those presented by counse1.99 Justices Stone, Brandeis, 
and Cardozo felt perfectly comfortable going beyond New York's arguments and found that 
Adkins should be overruled. Leuchtenburg has called Roberts's contention "unpersuasive."I00 
Only one historian, Charles Leonard, has found that Roberts had valid legal reasons for 
voiding the Tipaldo law. 101 Most others, "wary of public men who seek in retrospect to set 
the record straight," have found his memorandum contrived and his explanation, on the 
whole, to be "unlikely.,,102 
Besides the fact that he did not record his account in writing until several years after 
the fact, there are couple of reasons why Roberts's memorandum seems "unpersuasive" or 
"unlikely." First, Justice Roberts stated that he concurred with the majority based on the 
grounds that "the State had not asked us to re-examine or overrule Adkins and that, as we 
found no material difference in the facts of the two cases, we should therefore follow the 
97 3 April 1937, p. 368. 
98 For a complete copy of the memorandum, see Appendix A. 
99 New Deal Lawyers, p.279. 
100 Supreme Court Reborn, p. 177. 
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Adkins case." Butler's opinion, though at the outset stating that New York has not challenged 
the Adkins law, relies heavily on the Adkins precedent. At this point, Roberts would have 
been well-advised to write a separate concurring opinion which concentrated specifically on 
the grounds that Adkins should be overruled. "My proper course would have been to concur 
specially on the narrow ground I had taken, I did not do so." Roberts realized what he should 
have done at the time, yet he gives no reason why he concurred silently with Butler's opinion. 
Was he afraid to appear as if he were prepared to uphold minimum wage laws? Was he afraid 
to rule contrary to the wishes of the wealthy, powerful Liberty League, an organization which 
could assist him as a political candidate? There seems to be no better explanation. 
Another clue which is revealing is Roberts's recalling of the remarks of his brethren 
when he voted to review the Parrish caSe. Roberts voted to review Parrish because it 
definitely assailed the Adkins precedent. "Those who were in the majority in the Morehead 
[Tipaldo] case expressed some surprise at my vote, and I heard one of the brethren ask 
another, 'What is the matter with Roberts?'" David Burner has skillfully noted that "surely 
the Four Horsemen, unless their surprise was feigned, would have been wary of Roberts on 
this matter had he earlier in the year dropped the hints he remembered.,,103 
The only purpose which the memorandum successfully accomplished was that Justice 
Roberts's switch was no longer tied to Roosevelt's court-packing proposal. Due to Justice 
Stone's illness, Roberts rightfully noted that the announcen1ent of the Parrish decision had 
been delayed since December 19, 1936. Since Roosevelt's plan was not announced until 
February 5, 1937, it could not have been that his "switch" was in response to Roosevelt's 
plan. "These facts make it evident that no action taken by the President in the interim had any 
102 Burner, "Owen 1. Roberts," p. 2262. 
causal relation to my action in the Parrish case," Most observers and critics, though willing 
to grant Roberts the benefit of the doubt on this issue, cannot accept the obscure legal 
technicality upon which he based his "switch." After the 1936 elections, the writing on the 
wall was most evident to everyone, Roberts included. The Supreme Court and its strict 
laissez-faire constitutionalism could not last. 
Conclusion: Judges Are Human 
Introducing an article entitled "Judges Are Human," The Nation began: 
History has a way of weeding out the essential from the familiar. When 
future historians try to sum up the results of the 1937 controversy over the 
Supreme Court, they will pass by the arguments and slogans that have been 
staled by repetition-the talk either of packing or of unpacking the court, the 
charges of dictatorship leveled against the President or the judges. And they 
will find the most lasting result in the mind of the ordinary citizen is his 
increasing awareness, as a result of the Great Debate of 1937, that judges are 
after all human. 104 
The greatest significance of the events examined in this study are, indeed, that judges 
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are simply human after all. Justice Roberts, a man with many great attributes as well as faults, 
could not escape this fact. An ambition to be President probably led him to a personal, though 
also judicial, decision in the Tipaldo case which had universal ramifications politically and 
constitutionally. More than that, it sparked probably the greatest constitutional debate in this 
century. 
It is somewhat unsettling to realize that our Constitution, so often thought of as a 
secure document that has an answer for every controversy, is subject to the whims and 
pleasures of the nine people who happen to occupy the Supreme Court bench. And in an era 
103 Ibid., p. 2262. 
104 24 April 1937, p. 451. 
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which has seemingly lost nearly all faith in the wisdom and goodness of elected officials, 
Supreme Court justices are somewhat immune to public criticism on the grounds that they are 
highly experienced and qualified. We do not question their decisions, though we may try to 
persuade them one way or another. But while judges will always rule differently according to 
philosophical disagreements, it is quite disturbing to think that they may rule according to 
their own personal ambitions. 
Justice Roberts, acting more as an attorney rather than as ajudge, could likely see both 
sides of these cases. Therefore, if voting a particular way could serve to advance his career, 
that probably became a factor in his decision-making process. It is not for the historian to 
pass judgment as to whether Roberts was right or wrong to do so; the historian's job is to 
illustrate the effect that such action carried. In this case, Justice Roberts behdvior during this 
time greatly contributed to public concern about the Court, its power to void laws, and also to 
Roosevelt's indignation. The result, Roosevelt's court-packing plan, could have altered 
permanently the balance of power between the Court and the President. The President's plan, 
however, was ultimately unsuccessful, and Justice Roberts's "revolution" must have been a 
contributing factor to its failure. 
Appendix A 
Memorandum of Justice Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter 
November 9, 1945 
(This was reprinted in University of Pennsylvania Law Review 104 (1955): 314-315. 
"A petition for certiorari was filed in Moreheadv. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, on March 16, 1936. 
When the petition came to be acted upon, the Chief Justice spoke in favor of a grant, but several 
others spoke against it on the ground that the case was ruled by Adkins v. Children's Hospital 261 
U.S. 525. Justices Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone were in favor of a grant. They, with the Chief 
Justice, made up four votes for a grant. 
"When my tum came to speak I said I saw no reason to grant the writ unless the Court were 
prepared to re-examine and overrule the Adkins case. To this remark there was no response around 
the table, and the case was marked granted. 
"Both in the petition for certiorari, in the brief on the merits, and in oral argument, counsel 
for the State of New York took the position that it was unnecessary to overrule the Adkins case. The 
argument seemed to me to be disingenuous and born of timidity. I could find nothing in the record to 
substantiate the alleged distinction. At conference I so stated, and stated further that I was for taking 
the State of New York at its word. The State had not asked that the Adkins case be overruled but that 
it be distinguished. I said I was unwilling to put a decision on any such ground. The vote was five to 
four for affirmance, ~nd the case was assigned to Justice Butler. 
"I stated to him that I would concur in any opinion which was based on the fact that the State 
had not asked us to re-examine or overrule Adkins and that, as we found no material difference in the 
facts of the two cases, we should therefore follow the Adkins case. The case was originally so written 
by Justice Butler, but after a dissent had been circulated he added matter to his opinion, seeking to 
sustain the Adkins case in principle. My proper course would have been to concur specially on the 
narrow ground I had taken. I did not do so. But at conference in the Court I said that I did not 
propose to review and re-examine the Adkins case until a case should come to the Court requiring that 
this should be done. 
"August 17, 1936, an appeal was filed in West Coast Hotels [sic] Company v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379. The Court as usual met to consider applications in the week of Monday, October 5, 1936, 
and concluded its work by Saturday, October 10. During the conferences the jurisdictional statement 
in the Parrish case was considered and the question arose whether the appeal should be dismissed* on 
the authority of Adkins and Morehead. Four of those who had voted in the majority in the Morehead 
case voted to dismiss the appeal in the Parrish case. I stated that I would vote for the notation of 
probable jurisdiction. I am not sure that I gave my reason, but it was that in the appeal in the Parrish 
case the authority of Adkins was definitely assailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and 
overrule it. Thus, for the first time, I was confronted with the neccessity of facing the soundness of 
the Adkins case. Those who were in the majority in the Morehead case expressed some surprise at 
my vote, and I heard one of the brethren ask another, 'What is the matter with Roberts?' 
"Justice Stone was taken ill about October 14. The case was argued December 16 and 17, 
1936, in the absence of Justice Stone, who at that time was lying in a comatose condition at his home, 
It came on for consideration at the conference on December 19. I voted for an affirmance. There 
• Evidently he meant should be reversed summarily, since the Washington Supreme Court had sustained the 
statute. 
were three other such votes, those of the Chief Justice, Justice Brandeis, and Justice Cardozo. The 
other four voted for a reversal. 
"If a decision had then been announced, the case would have been affirmed by a divided 
Court. It was thought that this would be an unfortunate outcome, as everyone on the Court knew 
Justice Stone's views. The case was, therefore, laid over for further consideration when Justice Stone 
should be able to participate. Justice Stone was convalescent during January and returned to the 
sessions of the Court on February 1, 1937. I believe that the Parrish case was taken up at the 
conference on February 6, 1937, and Justice Stone then voted for affinnance. This made it possible to 
assign the case for an opinion, which was done. The decision affinning the lower court was 
announced March 29, 1937. 
"These facts make it evident that no action taken by the President in the interim had any 
causal relation to my action in the Parrish case." 
Appendix B 
The Justices of the Supreme Court, 1936 
Charles Evans Hughes, Chief Justice 
Nominated by: TaftIHoover 
State: New York 
Party affiliation: Republican 
Willis Van Devanter 
Nominated by: Taft 
State: Wyoming 
Party affiliation: Republican 
J ames McReynolds 
Nominated by: Wilson 
State: Tennessee 
Party affiliation: Democrat 
Louis Brandeis 
Nominated by: Wilson 
State: Massachusetts 
Party affiliation: Independent 
Pierce Butler 
Nominated by: Harding 
State: Minnesota 
Party affiliation: Democrat 
George Sutherland 
Nominated by: Harding 
State: Utah 
Party affiliation: Republican 
Harlan Fiske Stone 
Nominated by: Coolidge 
State: New York 
Party affiliation: Republican 
Owen Roberts 
Nominated by: Hoover 
State: Pennsylvania 
Party affiliation: Republican 
Benjamin Cardozo 
Nominated by: Hoover 
State: New York 
Party affiliation: Democrat 
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